Case Title | Rungta Mines Limited VS Commissioner of Central Goods and Services Tax |
Court | Jharkhand High Court |
Honorable Judges | Justice Aparesh Kumar Singh Justice Anubha Rawat Choudhary |
Citation | 2022 (02) GSTPanacea 665 HC Jharkhand W.P.(T) No. 2245 of 2020 |
Judgement Date | 15-February-2022 |
Section 140 of the CGST Act, along with Rule 117 of the CGST Rules, outlines the mechanism for transitioning CENVAT credit from the pre-GST regime to the GST regime. It mandates that the closing balance of CENVAT credit as per the last return filed under the old law (ER-1 return) be carried forward by filing a declaration in Form GST TRAN-1. This transitional credit is then credited to the Electronic Credit Ledger of the taxpayer under the CGST Act.
Section 140(5) of the CGST Act specifically addresses situations where claiming credit in the ER-1 returns for June 2017 is impractical due to the timing of invoice receipt and the filing deadline for ER-1. In such cases, the taxpayer is only required to disclose the receipt of services in their books of accounts.
Section 141 of the CGST Act pertains to transitional provisions related to job work, which is not relevant to the petitioner’s case.
Section 142 of the CGST Act deals with miscellaneous transitional provisions not covered under Sections 140 or 141. The petitioner argues that their case falls under Section 142(3), which permits the refund of CENVAT credit in cash under specific circumstances as a transitional measure.
Moving to the second part of the summary,
Section 142(3) of the CGST Act allows for the refund of CENVAT credit in cash to the assessee under certain conditions. This provision is intended to address transitional issues where accrued credits need to be monetized or refunded due to specific contingencies or circumstances arising from the implementation of GST.
In conclusion, the petitioner’s case hinges on Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, which they argue entitles them to seek a refund of CENVAT credit in cash under the transitional provisions of GST. This provision is crucial as it provides a mechanism beyond mere credit transfer to address situations where cash refund is warranted, thereby ensuring smooth transition and fairness in the tax regime changeover.
In the present legal matter, the petitioner has approached the court seeking a refund of CENVAT Credit under the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime, asserting that such refund constitutes a vested, accrued, and substantive right. The petitioner argues that the denial of refund by the authorities violates several fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution of India, specifically Articles 14 (right to equality), 19 (1) (g) (right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business), 265 (right to not be taxed without authority of law), and 300A (right to property).
The crux of the petitioner’s case revolves around Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, which the petitioner contends is a substantive provision allowing for the refund of CENVAT Credit in special circumstances, particularly in cases where invoices were received after the GST Act came into force. The petitioner argues that the authorities have improperly disregarded this provision, which is crucial for granting the refund in question.
Moreover, the petitioner emphasizes that the CENVAT Credit represents a substantive benefit earned lawfully under the previous tax regime, which cannot be arbitrarily denied without due process of law. This position is supported by legal precedents cited by the petitioner’s counsel, demonstrating that such vested rights cannot be extinguished without proper legal authority.
Furthermore, the petitioner asserts that the legislative intent behind Section 142(3) of the CGST Act was to provide for refunds in transitional situations not covered by Section 140 of the CGST Act. This legislative intent, according to the petitioner, underscores the necessity of granting the refund under the provisions of Section 142(3), in conjunction with Section 11B of the Central Excise Act.
The petitioner criticizes the authorities for erroneously relying on Section 140 of the CGST Act while ignoring Section 142(3), thereby acting in an arbitrary manner that lacks legal justification. This, the petitioner argues, constitutes a failure to exercise discretionary powers in a judicious manner as required by law.
In conclusion, the petitioner seeks the court’s intervention to uphold their vested and substantive right to claim the refund of CENVAT Credit under the provisions of Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, asserting that the denial of this right by the authorities is unconstitutional and violates fundamental principles of justice and equity as enshrined in the Constitution of India.
The legal arguments presented are supported by pertinent judicial decisions that uphold similar rights and principles, thereby bolstering the petitioner’s case for the grant of refund.
a) In the case of K.S. Paripoornan Vs. State of Kerala and Others (1994), the Supreme Court highlighted that transitional provisions in legislation serve the specific purpose of applying laws to existing circumstances when new legislation comes into effect.
b) Referring to J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. (1961), the principle emerged that in situations where a specific provision conflicts with a general one, the specific provision takes precedence. The general provision applies only where the specific provision does not cover a particular case.
c) From Union of India Vs. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem De Gama (1990), it was concluded that transitional provisions should be interpreted with their intended purpose in mind, aiming to smoothly transition from old laws to new ones.
d) In Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore Vs. J.H. Gotla, Yadagiri (1985), it was established that in matters of taxation, if a strict literal interpretation leads to unjust outcomes, a more equitable interpretation should be adopted.
e) In Gammon India Ltd. Vs. Special Chief Secretary and Others (2006), the Supreme Court ruled that rights preserved by saving provisions continue even after the repeal of old laws, emphasizing the continuity of accrued rights.
f) From Baraka Overseas Traders Vs. Director General of Foreign Trade and Another (2006), it was clarified that rights accrued under old laws persist under new legislation, ensuring continuity and protection of vested rights.
g) State of Punjab and Ors. Vs. Bhajan Kaur and Ors. (2008) established that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not create new rights but safeguards existing rights, which must be determined based on the law existing at the time, unless a contrary intention is clear.
h) Eicher Motors Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India and Others (1999) affirmed that rights acquired under existing laws should not be arbitrarily altered by new legislation, ensuring stability and predictability in legal rights.
i) Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore Vs. Grasim Industries Ltd. (2018) determined that excise duty or CENVAT operates akin to a value-added tax, highlighting the nature of these taxes in the context of economic transactions.
j) Kunal Kumar Tiwari Vs. State of Bihar and Another (2018) underscored the principle that interpretations of laws should favor advancing the purpose or objectives underlying the legislation, promoting a purposive approach to statutory interpretation.
These cases collectively illustrate various principles of statutory interpretation, especially regarding transitional provisions, conflict between specific and general provisions, continuity of rights, equitable interpretation in taxation, and the overarching goal of advancing legislative intent. Each case contributes to understanding how courts interpret and apply laws to ensure fairness, continuity, and adherence to legislative intent in legal proceedings.
In response to the petitioner’s plea, the counsel representing the respondents vehemently opposed the prayer for relief. They argued that the orders issued by the authorities were meticulously reasoned and did not exhibit any illegality or perversity that would warrant intervention through writ jurisdiction. According to the respondent’s counsel, the denial of the refund claim was justified under the prevailing legal framework. They emphasized that the petitioner failed to adhere to the stipulated timelines for claiming CENVAT Credit under the existing law, and consequently, could not utilize TRAN-1 under Section 140 of the CGST Act, which deals with transitional provisions for input tax credit.
The respondent’s counsel contended that the refund application itself was misconceived and lacked merit, asserting that Section 142(3) of the CGST Act was inapplicable to the circumstances of the case. They further argued that the procedure for availing CENVAT Credit, particularly in relation to the disputed input service, was clearly outlined under Section 140 of the CGST Act. This involved initially claiming credit through ER-1 monthly returns and subsequently through TRAN-1, which the petitioner allegedly failed to accomplish within the prescribed timelines.
In conclusion, the respondent’s counsel underscored that the issue of refund is strictly governed by statutory provisions, and the petitioner did not conform to the legal requirements. They dismissed the applicability of both Section 142(3) and Section 140(5) of the CGST Act to the present case, maintaining that the petitioner’s claim lacked foundation in law and procedural compliance. Thus, they urged the court to uphold the authorities’ decisions and dismiss the petitioner’s writ petition accordingly.
In the legal proceedings, the learned counsel representing the respondents strongly opposed the petitioner’s plea. They argued that the orders issued by the authorities were well-founded and should not be interfered with through writ jurisdiction. According to the respondents, there were no legal irregularities or unreasonable decisions that warranted intervention. They contended that the petitioner’s claim for refund was rightfully rejected because the petitioner had not fulfilled the necessary conditions under the prevailing laws. Specifically, they pointed out that the petitioner failed to claim CENVAT Credit within the prescribed timeframe as per the existing laws, and therefore could not avail it under Section 140 of the CGST Act, which deals with transitional arrangements for input tax credit.
The respondents further emphasized that the petitioner’s application for refund was misconceived and lacked merit. They argued that provisions like Section 142(3) of the CGST Act did not apply to the petitioner’s case. Additionally, they asserted that the petitioner was not entitled to claim refund of service tax paid on input services related to port services. The counsel clarified that under the previous legal framework prior to the introduction of the GST Act in 2017, refund of CENVAT Credit on input services was available only to output service providers or exporters, a condition which the petitioner did not meet.
Regarding the transitional provisions under Section 140 of the CGST Act, the respondents cited that the petitioner did not adhere to the prescribed procedures, such as including CENVAT Credit in their ER-1 monthly return and subsequently claiming it through TRAN-1. They argued that the petitioner’s failure to comply with these procedures precluded them from claiming input tax credit through any other mechanism.
Moreover, the respondents highlighted that the petitioner incorrectly availed credit of service tax in their ST-3 return despite not being an output service provider. They pointed out that the petitioner’s registration under the Service Tax was solely for meeting obligations under the reverse charge mechanism, further complicating their eligibility for claiming CENVAT Credit.
In conclusion, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the petitioner’s refund application was rightly denied based on the clear provisions of the law applicable at the time. They maintained that the decisions taken by the authorities were lawful and justified, and therefore, urged the court not to grant relief to the petitioner.
In the case presented, the learned counsel representing the respondents vigorously opposed the petitioner’s plea, arguing that the orders challenged by the petitioner were well-founded and legally sound. They contended that there were no procedural irregularities or unjust decisions that warranted intervention through writ jurisdiction. The crux of their argument was that the petitioner was not entitled to the refund of service tax under the existing legal framework. They emphasized that the petitioner failed to claim CENVAT Credit within the stipulated time under the previous law, and thus could not avail of transitional provisions under Section 140 of the CGST Act.
Furthermore, the counsel argued that the petitioner’s application for refund was misconceived from the outset, citing that Section 142(3) and Section 140(5) of the CGST Act did not apply to the circumstances of the case. They pointed out that the petitioner did not fulfill the necessary conditions to claim CENVAT Credit through ER-1 monthly returns and subsequently through TRAN-1.
Moreover, they highlighted that the petitioner improperly took credit for service tax under ST-3 returns despite not qualifying as an output service provider. They asserted that the petitioner’s failure to declare CENVAT Credit in their final ER-1 return for June 2017, and their subsequent omission to claim the credit via TRAN-1 even after the extended deadline, were critical lapses that precluded their eligibility for the credit.
In support of their arguments, the respondents’ counsel referred to Section 140 of the CGST Act, 2017, which governs transitional arrangements for input tax credit. They also cited a relevant Supreme Court judgment (Union of India and Others Vs. VKC Footsteps India Private Ltd., 2021 SCC online SC 706), which affirmed that refund of taxes is a statutory right and not a fundamental or constitutional right. This decision upheld the legislative classification regarding the refund of input tax credit based on different criteria, including the nature of input goods versus input services.
In conclusion, the respondents’ counsel contended that the petitioner’s claims for refund were rightly denied due to their failure to comply with statutory provisions and timelines, as outlined in the applicable laws and regulations. They asserted that the authorities acted correctly in rejecting the petitioner’s refund claims, and therefore, the petition lacked merit.
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