Amani Machine Centre VS The State Tax Officer

The petitioner in this case has brought forth a grievance regarding assessment orders issued under Section 62 of the Goods and Services Tax Act (referred to as “the Act”). They challenge assessment orders (P12 to P22) arguing that they submitted relevant returns (P23 to P33) after receiving the assessment orders, albeit beyond the 30-day window stipulated for such filings. Consequently, they are ineligible for the benefits outlined in Section 62(2), where orders would be deemed withdrawn except for interest or late fee payments under Section 47.

The petitioner’s counsel contends that Section 62(1) references Section 44, which pertains to annual returns, allowing assessing authorities to conduct best judgment assessments within five years from the date specified under Section 44. Since best judgment assessments could only conclude after December of the financial year per Section 44 of the CGST Act, they argue that the period until December 31 following the financial year’s end should mark the commencement date for the respondents to undertake best judgment assessments under Section 62.

In essence, the argument posits that the petitioner should have until December 31 following the financial year’s end to file annual returns, and this timeframe should also determine when the respondents can initiate best judgment assessments under Section 62 of the Act.

The case presented to the court revolves around assessment orders issued under Section 62 of the Goods and Services Tax Act. The petitioner argues that despite submitting relevant returns after receiving assessment orders, they were not filed within the stipulated 30-day period following the service of these orders. Consequently, the petitioner forfeited the benefit outlined in Section 62(2) of the Act, which would have otherwise deemed the orders withdrawn, subject to the payment of interest or late fees.

The petitioner’s counsel contends that Section 62(1) references Section 44, which pertains to the filing of annual returns. They argue that since best judgment assessments can only be completed after the end of the financial year, as specified in Section 44, the assessing authority could only proceed after December of that year. Essentially, the petitioner asserts that the timeline for best judgment assessments should align with the deadline for annual returns filing.

However, after hearing arguments from both parties, the court finds the petitioner’s proposition untenable. The court interprets the reference to Section 44 in Section 62 as solely determining the five-year period within which the assessing officer must complete the best judgment assessment. It does not mandate initiating the assessment process only after December of the financial year.

According to the court’s understanding, Section 62 empowers the assessing officer to initiate best judgment assessments immediately after detecting a failure to file returns, even before the end of the financial year. The five-year limit serves as the outer boundary for completing such assessments. Therefore, the court views the five-year timeframe as a statutory limit rather than indicative of a specific starting point for assessment proceedings following a default by the assessee.

The petitioner in this case has brought forward grievances concerning assessment orders (Exts.P12 to 22) issued under Section 62 of the Goods and Services Tax Act. The crux of the petitioner’s argument is that although they submitted relevant returns (Exts.P23 to P33) after receiving the assessment orders, these returns were not filed within the 30-day timeframe stipulated by Section 62. Consequently, the petitioner is ineligible for the benefits outlined in Section 62(2), which would have deemed the orders withdrawn except for the payment of interest or late fees under Section 47.

The petitioner’s counsel argues that since Section 62(1) refers to Section 44 of the Act, which pertains to the filing of annual returns, the assessing authority’s best judgment assessment, as per Section 62, could only be completed after December of the financial year specified in Section 44. Essentially, the contention is that the deadline for the best judgment assessment should align with the deadline for annual returns filing, extending the assessment period until December 31st of the following year.

After hearing arguments from both the petitioner’s counsel and the government pleader representing the respondents, the court finds the petitioner’s proposition untenable. It concludes that Section 44 is referenced in Section 62 solely to establish the five-year timeframe for completing the best judgment assessment, rather than dictating when the assessment process should commence. Therefore, the assessing officer can initiate the best judgment assessment immediately after detecting the failure to file returns, with a maximum timeframe of five years from the date specified under Section 44 for annual returns filing.

Given that the petitioner failed to submit valid returns within 30 days of receiving the assessment orders under Section 62(1), they are not entitled to the benefits under Section 62(2). Consequently, the court dismisses the writ petition challenging the assessment orders.

The petitioner has filed a writ petition contesting assessment orders (P12 to P22) issued under Section 62 of the Goods and Services Tax Act (referred to as ‘the Act’). The petitioner argues that although they submitted relevant returns (P23 to P33) after receiving the assessment orders, they missed the 30-day deadline for filing returns after receiving the assessment orders. Consequently, they cannot benefit from Section 62(2), which would have withdrawn the assessment orders unless late fees or interest were paid under Section 47. The petitioner’s counsel argues that Section 62(1) refers to Section 44 of the Act, which deals with annual returns, suggesting that best judgment assessment could only be completed after December of the financial year mentioned in Section 44.

However, the court finds this argument unconvincing. It interprets the reference to Section 44 in Section 62 as only determining the five-year period for completing best judgment assessment, not as delaying the initiation of assessment until December. According to the court, Section 62 empowers the assessing officer to proceed with best judgment assessment immediately after detecting failure to file returns and issue the assessment order within five years from the date specified under Section 44 for annual returns. Therefore, the five-year limit serves as an outer limit for completing assessment, not as a starting point for assessment proceedings.

Since the petitioner failed to file valid returns within 30 days of receiving the assessment orders, they cannot benefit from Section 62(2). Consequently, the challenge to the assessment orders in the writ petition fails, and it is dismissed. However, considering the petitioner’s intention to appeal the assessment orders, the court orders a six-week stay on recovery proceedings to allow the petitioner time to appeal. The petitioner must provide a copy of the writ petition and the court’s judgment to the respondents for further action.

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