BALAJI COAL TRADERS VS. COMMISSIONER, COMMERCIAL TAX

Case Title

BALAJI COAL TRADERS VS. COMMISSIONER, COMMERCIAL TAX

Court

Allahabad High Court

Honourable judges

Justice Shekhar B. Saraf

Citation

2024 (05) GSTPanacea 55 HC Allahabad

Writ Tax No. 1614 of 2022

Judgment Date

17-May-2024

This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arises from the petitioner’s grievances against multiple orders passed by state tax authorities. Specifically, the petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated April 19, 2022, issued by the Assistant Commissioner, State Tax, Sector -7, Agra (hereinafter referred to as ‘Respondent No. 2’), the order dated July 12, 2022, issued by the Assistant Commissioner, State Tax, Sector – 5, Agra (hereinafter referred to as ‘Respondent No. 3’), and the order dated November 24, 2022, passed by the first appellate authority. The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed as time-barred by the first appellate authority in the order dated November 24, 2022. The petitioner was granted a registration certificate under the U.P. Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘UPGST Act’). However, the registration of the petitioner was cancelled by Respondent No. 2 through the impugned order dated April 19, 2022. Subsequently, the petitioner filed an application for revocation of the cancellation of registration before Respondent No. 3, which was rejected via the impugned order dated July 12, 2022. Aggrieved by the order dated July 12, 2022, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 107 of the UPGST Act. The first appellate authority, vide the order dated November 24, 2022, dismissed the appeal as time-barred. The relevant portions of the impugned order dated November 24, 2022, are extracted herein below. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material on record.

The primary issue for consideration in this writ petition is whether the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 107 of the UPGST Act was within the statutory time limit. This critical question hinges on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the UPGST Act and the application of the statutory timelines for filing an appeal. It is pertinent to examine whether the petitioner adhered to the prescribed period for filing an appeal and whether any delays in filing the appeal can be justified under the provisions of the UPGST Act or established judicial precedents. The petitioner contends that the appeal was filed within the permissible time frame and that any delay, if at all, was minor and excusable given the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the registration and the subsequent rejection of the application for revocation. The petitioner argues that the authorities, in dismissing the appeal as time-barred, have failed to consider the merits of the case and the genuine difficulties faced in meeting the strict timelines.

On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the appeal was indeed filed beyond the statutory period and that the dismissal by the first appellate authority was in accordance with the provisions of the UPGST Act. The respondents assert that the procedural timelines are sacrosanct and any deviation undermines the regulatory framework established for the administration of the GST regime. The respondents further argue that the petitioner had ample opportunity to file the appeal within the stipulated period and that the reasons for the delay do not warrant an extension of the statutory deadline.

In light of the arguments presented, it is crucial to delve into the specifics of the statutory provisions governing the time limits for filing appeals under the UPGST Act. Section 107 of the UPGST Act outlines the procedural requirements and timelines for filing an appeal against orders passed by the adjudicating authority. A thorough analysis of these provisions, along with any relevant judicial interpretations, will aid in determining the validity of the petitioner’s claims and the appropriateness of the respondents’ actions.

Furthermore, the principles of natural justice and fair play must be considered while adjudicating this matter. The petitioner’s right to be heard and to seek redressal against adverse orders is fundamental, and any procedural technicalities should not overshadow substantive justice. If the petitioner’s delay in filing the appeal can be reasonably justified, it would be incumbent upon the Court to ensure that the petitioner’s case is heard on merits rather than being dismissed on technical grounds.

Therefore, this Court must carefully evaluate the circumstances leading to the delay, the justifications provided by the petitioner, and the adherence to procedural requirements by the respondents. Only after a comprehensive examination of these aspects can a just and equitable decision be reached, ensuring that the petitioner’s rights are duly protected and the principles of justice are upheld. In conclusion, this writ petition raises significant questions regarding the interpretation of statutory timelines, adherence to procedural norms, and the balance between technical compliance and substantive justice. The resolution of this matter will not only impact the petitioner but also set a precedent for similar cases where procedural delays are in question.

I have reproduced the relevant subsections of Section 107 of the UPGST Act herein for ease of reference: 107. Appeals to Appellate Authority. — (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act or the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 by an adjudicating authority may appeal to such Appellate Authority as may be prescribed within three months from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated to such person. The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months or six months, as the case may be, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month. Since the clock of limitation starts running “from the date on which the said order or decision is communicated to such person,” it would be prudent to refer to Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘GC Act’) which provides as follows: “9. Commencement and termination of time. — (1) In any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from,” and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “to.” (2) This section applies also to all [Central Acts] made after the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.”

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