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Case Title |
Nandan Steels and Power Limited vs State of Chattisgarh |
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Court |
Chattisgarh High Court |
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Honorable Judges |
Justices Arup Kumar Goswami and Justice Parth Prateem Sahu |
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Citation |
2022 (8) GSTPanacea 146 HC Chattisgarh WA No. 104 of 2021 |
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Judgement Date |
10- August- 2022 |
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Council for Petitioner |
Mr. Prateek Pandey |
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Council for Respondent |
Vikram Sharma |
The High Court of Chattisgarh, Bilaspur bench of Justices Justices Arup Kumar Goswami and Parth Prateem Sahu, has held that they don’t find no merit in this appeal and accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The appellant is a Private Limited Company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and engaged in the business of manufacturing iron and steel products. The appellant had filed TRAN-1 to claim CGST input credit of Rs.30,74,436/-. However, the Adjudicating Authority by an order dated 26.06.2019 had disallowed the CGST input credit of Rs.25,33,950/-.
Against the aforesaid order, the appellant preferred an appeal on 16.12.2019 under Section 107 (1) of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 (for short, ‘CGST Act’) before respondent No.3 and had deposited 10% of the amount in dispute. The appeal was rejected by an order dated 20.12.2019 passed by respondent No.3 on the ground of the same being barred by limitation. Writ petition was filed assailing the said order dated 20.12.2019 passed by respondent No.3 with a further prayer to direct the respondent No.3 to hear the appeal preferred by the appellant on merits.
Mr. Prateek Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant submits that delay that had occasioned was on account of the fact that the Chartered Accountant, who was authorised by the appellant to prefer an appeal, had suffered serious ailment, and therefore, an application for condonation of delay had been filed. In such circumstance, respondent No. 3 ought to have considered the application for condonation of delay. He has drawn our attention to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘Limitation Act’) and submits that there being no express exclusion of provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act under the CGST Act, respondent No.3 had power to condone the delay on satisfaction being arrived at that there was sufficient cause for the delay.
Mr. Vikram Sharma, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the respondents, submits that the CGST Act is a special law and same is a complete code by itself and the relevant provisions make it abundant clear that the provisions of Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, and therefore, the submission of Mr. Pandey that there is power to condone delay even beyond the period prescribed is entirely misplaced.
COURT HELD
The Court considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials on record. It will be appropriate to take note of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which reads as follows:
“29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
A reading of Section 29(2) would go to show that the section is divided into two parts, manifested by the expression “and”. The first part stipulates that the limitation period prescribed by the special law or local law will prevail over the limitation period prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act. The second part of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act ordains that the Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will apply for determining the period of limitation “only insofar as, and to the extent which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”(Emphasis given). CGST Act is a “special law” which prescribes a specific period of limitation in Sections 107(1) and 107(4), and therefore, the provisions of CGST Act will apply. It is also to be noted that there is no provision under the Limitation Act dealing with the subject matter of appeal under the CGST Act.
. In the context of the present case, it would also be relevant to take note of Sections 117(1) and (2) of the CGST Act, which read as follows:
“(1) Any person aggrieved by any order passed by the State Bench or Area Benches of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court and the High Court may admit such appeal, if it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.
(2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within a period of one hundred and eighty days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by the aggrieved person and it shall be in such form, verified in such manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within such period.”
A perusal of the above Sections go to show that in respect of an appeal to the High Court, the Legislature has not provided any specific time limit for entertainment of an appeal after expiry of the period of limitation if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the same within the period of limitation. In respect of an appeal under Section 107(1) of CGST Act, it is provided that the appeal may be filed within three months from the date on which the decision or order is communicated to such person. Section 107(4) of CGST Act lays down that on sufficient cause being shown, the Appellate Authority may allow the appeal to be presented within a further period of one month. The same would go to show that the legislative intent was not to apply the Limitation Act in the proceedings to be taken under the CGST Act. If the intention had been otherwise, there would have been no occasion for conferring specifically power to the High Court to entertain an appeal after the expiry of the period of limitation of 180 days if it was satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within such period as Section 5 of the Limitation Act would have become applicable by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Absence of the words ‘but not thereafter’ as appearing in the Act of 1996 is of no moment. In view of the above discussion, we find no merit in this appeal and accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed.
ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT
By noticing the above order we analyse that the legislative intent was not to apply the Limitation Act in the proceedings to be taken under the CGST Act.
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